Many are currently questioning the IMF's relevance, due to the shrinkage of its loan portfolio and concerns about its legitimacy, especially in Asia. Countries do not want to borrow from the Fund so as not to face the intrusive policy conditionality associated with its lending, and at the same time the absence of crises makes such borrowing unnecessary. While this may be an indication of the IMF's success in limiting crises, the IMF's unpopularity stems from mistakes in its policy advice to Asian crisis countries and to Argentina. Two main approaches are being pursued to make the IMF more relevant and legitimate: involve the institution more directly in resolving global imbalances, and reforming IMF quotas to give larger shares to emerging market countries, especially those in Asia. Both approaches have their limitations, and neither promises to allow the Fund to recapture its former prominence, given the continuing expansion of private capital. Defining a more modest role for the IMF that is congruent with such an international monetary system, rather than attempting to expand its activities, seems a more promising way to reestablish its legitimacy and effectiveness. * I am grateful to Wendy Dobson, Jeroen Kremers, and Bessma Momani for helpful comments.
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The IMF: Victim of Its Own Success or Institutional Failure?
The International Monetary Fund, created at the end of the Second World War at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to manage an international monetary system characterized by fixed exchange rates and heavily restricted international capital flows, now faces widespread questioning of its relevance. Calls for its abolition are not new:
with the abandonment of fixed parities by the major industrial countries and the demise of the "Bretton Woods system" in 1973, the IMF seemed to have become obsolete, or at least to have had its mandate drastically reduced. During the 1980s, however, the IMF once again became the key player in international finance by helping to contain the debt crisis affecting developing countries. Private capital flows to developing countries dried up after Mexico's default in August, 1982 , leaving those countries with large debts they could not service; the IMF provided new financing as well as assistance with restructuring their debts.
The IMF's role in the world economy was further enhanced when the formerly centrally planned economies began their transition to the market and started to integrate into the world economy at the end of the 1980s. The Fund lent money to virtually all of those countries, and also became involved giving detailed policy advice on structural transformations and the creation of market-based institutions. While private capital flows to many developing countries resumed strongly in the early 1990s, the access to international capital markets did not eliminate their need for occasional recourse to borrowing from the Fund, as private capital was volatile and subject to "sudden stops." Thus, the Fund was centrally involved in providing loans and policy advice to countries facing crises during the 1990s: Mexico, the former "Asian tiger" countries, Russia, Brazil, and Argentina. the Asian crisis countries has ceased. As a result, aside from its program with Turkey, the IMF has no large outstanding loans. This means that its lending goes almost exclusively to the lower-income developing countries 1 , most of it at concessional rates and with the objective of poverty reduction-in close collaboration with the World Bank, which has a clearer mandate in this area. Given that the IMF covers its operating expenses with income received from the spread between its lending rate and the rate of remuneration paid to its depositors-the creditor countries, which now constitute the bulk of its membership-the shrinkage in IMF loans outstanding has serious implications for its budget and the continued employment of a staff of well-trained and highly paid economists.
More seriously for the IMF's continuing relevance with the middle-and upperincome developing countries-the "emerging market economies"-is the fall-out from the policy advice and conditions that accompanied IMF lending during the Asian crises of 1997-98. Those countries almost unanimously viewed the IMF's prescriptions as intrusive and wrong-headed 2 . Some have even gone so far as to blame the Fund for their economic woes: in Korea, that period is known as the "IMF crisis." As a result, countries in East Asia-those affected by the crisis as well as others, in particular China and Japan-have accumulated vast amounts of foreign exchange reserves that may permit them to ride out future crises without access to the relatively modest amount of IMF financing that might be offered. For instance, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and
Thailand-countries hardest hit by the 1997-98 crisis-have foreign exchange reserves that total in excess of $300 billion, far greater than the roughly $50 billion provided by the Fund in the earlier period. As for China and Japan, each has forex reserves that amount to about $1 trillion-larger than the total size of the IMF's balance sheet. In addition, the ability of countries in the region to deploy these reserves in a crisis is enhanced by pooling: the Chiang Mai Initiative allows countries in the region (ASEAN plus China, Korea, and Japan) to draw on a portion of other countries' reserves, subject to certain conditions. Part of this drawing would be aligned with IMF conditionality, but • Reallocate voting rights (and financial contributions, or quotas) towards the emerging market economies that are underrepresented; • Refocus the IMF's work to include greater attention to systemic issues, such as global payments imbalances and interactions among countries; • Increase the IMF's financial resources (through increases in member contributions, SDR allocations, or through borrowing on international capital markets) in order to make IMF programs more effective and perhaps to make the IMF into a true lender of last resort; • Sharpen the Fund's analysis of the policy choices of member countries, particularly as regards their exchange rate regimes, and make public its criticisms; • Create new forms of IMF lending, for instance to insure countries against shocks to their balance of payments, to pre-qualify countries for quick disbursements, or to deepen markets for developing country debt.
The IMF itself has reacted to its diminished role by a fever of self-examination.
The current Managing Director, Rodrigo de Rato, in office since 2004, has propounded a medium-term strategy of evolutionary change that would increase emerging market quotas, focus the work of the Fund on global imbalances, sharpen its analysis and prevention of financial crises, while retaining the IMF's commitment to poverty reduction in the poorest countries but simplifying procedures and making them more responsive to local needs. Some modest steps have been taken in repositioning the Fund.
First, there has been some rebalancing of quotas; in September 2006, quota increases for China, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey were approved, since-according to the application of formulas based on GDP, current payments and receipts, and forex reserves-these countries were the most egregious cases of under-representation. While agreement in principle has been reached to bring about a more thoroughgoing reform of quotas, how this will be done is very contentious and compromise will be difficult, as will be the necessary ratification by national legislatures. Second, the G7-in particular the United
States-has endorsed the responsibility of the Fund to analyse global imbalances and come up with policies to resolve them. However, despite the publicity given to this initiative, it does not constitute a new mandate for the Fund, which has always had competence in this area 4 . Without new powers of persuasion over the countries concerned-the United States, China, or the oil exporting countries, none of which has any need or intention to borrow from the IMF-it is hard to see how the Fund can in the future be more effective than it has been in the past. Finally, the issue of the continued lending by the IMF for poverty reduction, on concessional terms, does not seem consistent with refocusing the institution on its core competencies or with its straitened budgetary circumstances 5 . In short, the IMF's response has so far been viewed as inadequate, prompting some 6 to accuse the Fund of "being asleep at the switch" for not being more critical of China's exchange rate policies and another 7 to characterize the institution as "floating rudderless on a sea of liquidity."
The critics of the Fund cannot all be right; some would abolish it, while others would increase its resources several-fold in order to make it the international equivalent of a central bank, able to flood the financial system with large amounts of liquidity at 4 For instance, Article 1(vi) gives one of the purposes of the Fund "… to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members" and Article IV(3b) instructs the Fund to "… exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members, and [it] shall adopt specific principles for the guidance of all members with respect to those policies." 5 See Mussa (2006 In what follows, I will briefly review the postwar evolution of the international monetary system to provide some background for the IMF's current role, then speculate on whether current trends will continue. The Fund's performance over the last decade and a half conditions the likelihood that countries will be willing to give it an expanded role. The possibility of a major redesign of the international monetary system that would put the Fund at its centre, as was done at Bretton Woods in 1944, will be considered in that light. In discussing these issues, it is also essential to appreciate how different the international monetary system is now compared to even 20 years ago, much less 60 years ago. The extent of capital mobility is incomparably greater, driven by both technological and financial innovations, as well as by explicit dismantling of capital controls. This will limit severely the extent any of the proposed reforms will significantly enhance the IMF's role.
I. How Did the IMF Get to Where It Is?
The International Monetary Fund, like the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (or World Bank), was established at the Bretton Woods conference in New Hampshire in 1944. While the World Bank's mandate was to provide longer-term, development assistance, the IMF was given the responsibility to provide short term balance of payments loans to countries whose current account positions were in deficit as Eichengreen (2006 depends on their quota. The amount the IMF can lend is thus constrained by the funds deposited, but it is further limited by the fact that countries fulfill their quota in part by depositing their own currencies, and some of those currencies are not usable in international transactions. Unless the IMF resorts to borrowing, something it has rarely done in the past, the IMF must increase the size of quotas to increase the size of its lending; they are in any case reviewed every five years 9 .
But decisions on quota increases are contentious for several reasons. On the one hand, the relative size of countries matters for their influence in Fund decision-making, leading countries to want a larger quota. In particular, important decisions require an 85 percent majority (votes weighted by quota), and the United States, the country with the largest quota share (17 percent), is the only member with a blocking vote. It is likely to resist any set of quota increases that reduced that share below 15 percent. Quota shares matter to other countries also since they influence whether they can name their own Executive Director
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, and whether they can block a decision collectively with others of like mind. On the other hand, quota increases payable in hard currencies have a real resource cost for the country concerned. Even in the United States, which can create the hard currency to pay for the quota increase, there is often concern that increases in the IMF's resources may lead to excessive global liquidity and be inflationary. Thus, quota increases in the United States are subject to intense Congressional scrutiny and approval cannot be taken for granted.
Reluctance of member countries to increase IMF quotas has meant that the size of the resources made available to the Fund has not kept pace with the size of the world economy, as measured for instance by world trade 11 (Table 1 and Chart 1). Countries' foreign exchange reserves have grown much more rapidly, but they also lagged foreign trade growth until the latest subperiod, 1991-2006 (Chart 2). Moreover, the distribution of quotas has diverged from the relative economic importance of countries. Documents prepared for the IMF's quota reviews present formulas that relate quota shares to various economic indicators, but the formulas are contentious since they can be very sensitive to innocuous changes in the variables used or to the relative weights given to each formula (since a composite is calculated). In fact, the ultimate result has reflected squabbling and arm-twisting rather than a dispassionate application of economic criteria. Moreover, there is a natural inertia to the process, since the economic indicators that are used are typically historical averages that lag the latest data, and changes in relative position are resisted. Thus, emerging market countries, which have grown strongly in recent decades, tend to be under-represented, while more mature economies tend to be over-represented.
In particular, Europe, which was at the hub of the world economy at the time of the Bretton Woods conference despite the ravages of the war, has retained large quotas that by some measures no longer represent Europe's economic importance, and the EU has 7
10 Or, as the largest country in a constituency, can legitimately claim to represent that constituency and be elected to do so. Some constituencies rotate the right to nominate the director among the largest of the member countries. 11 The shortfall is even greater when compared to GDP growth. However, it is by no means straightforward to gauge the systemic importance of countries. Table 2 . The boom in inflows set the stage for their rapid withdrawal, making it difficult to prevent a financial crisis. Even if a net withdrawal does not occur, a "sudden stop" in gross lending will provoke a crisis if a country has substantial debt coming to maturity, which needs to be at least partially rolled over to prevent a default.
The virulence of the financial crises that occurred in the 1990s led to a reconsideration of the assumption that capital accounts should be liberalized. Malaysia imposed capital account restrictions at the height of the Asian crisis, and, though it suffered serious output losses and financial distress, it was somewhat less affected than its neighbours. Ten years after the crisis, however, it is clear that Malaysia's strategy will 15 Official exchange rate regime classifications can be misleading, since some countries declared their exchange rate regimes to be flexible while operating de facto pegs, and conversely some pegged rates were altered frequently. 16 For instance, the Bangkok International Banking Facility.
not be the new paradigm. Not only has that country partially reversed those restrictions, its experience and that of others has made it evident that there are costs from insulating oneself from international capital markets in today's world. Chile, which used a tax to discourage short-term capital inflows and hence reduce vulnerability to speculative outflows ("hot money"), learned that restrictions could be evaded through clever financial engineering. Chile has now also abandoned these controls. The adoption of flexible exchange rates makes capital controls mostly redundant, while financial development makes them increasingly costly. At most, therefore, the last decade's experience of emerging market crises may slow the movement to freer capital movements, not reverse it. The international monetary system, barring the equivalent of nuclear meltdown, will not move back to a system of pegged exchange rates and controls on capital. With more flexible exchange rates and greater access to international capital markets, countries are better able to cushion shocks without recourse to the Fund's lending.
III. Success or Failure?
The IMF has assumed three major new tasks since the 1980s debt crisis: 1) helping transform centrally planned regimes; 2) large-scale crisis lending to emerging market economies; and 3) promoting transparency, data dissemination, codes of conduct for monetary and fiscal policy, and financial regulation 17 . These new activities supplemented the traditional roles of performing surveillance over advanced and developing economies, promoting international economic cooperation and trade liberalization, and lending to finance current account deficits. These new tasks were, to an extent that is hard to assess, the result both of challenges thrown up by the world economy that naturally devolved to the Fund, and an explicit attempt by management of the institution to expand its mandate.
The period when these new tasks were taken on coincides with the tenure of Michel . Both were convinced that the IMF should be the preeminent international economic organization, and were skillful in convincing others to give the IMF new responsibilities. Thus, both the challenge posed by the fall of communism and the emerging market crises in the 1990s led the G7 to endorse an enlargement of the Fund's role. Camdessus and Fischer were also sincerely dedicated to reducing world poverty, which helps to explain the institution's expansion into a territory previously occupied by the World Bank.
Evaluating the IMF's success or failure in performing these new tasks is of course complicated because outcomes have to be compared to a counterfactual-what would have happened otherwise. As for the first of the three new activities, transforming centrally planned economies is largely completed, and this in itself is reason for considering it a success. Though there were clearly areas where in retrospect errors were made, and of course the IMF was not the sole agent for change, it is hard to dispute that both the IMF's lending, and the technical assistance and policy advice that accompanied it, helped facilitate the transition and cushion its negative effects. Unfortunately for the IMF's future role, this activity was a one-off event.
Crisis lending in a context of high capital mobility, task 2), has garnered much less praise for the institution. The type of lending that was done in the 1990s-to Mexico, the . Thus, the potential balance of payments gap was substantially larger than just the current account deficit. Also, this lending included much more extensive policy conditions than the lending to developing countries in the 1980s.
There are several causes for this. First, the IMF had gotten involved with structural conditionality since it seemed necessary for the centrally planned economies, and staff continued along that path. Bureaucratic imperatives make appearing to be tough with the authorities a winning strategy at head office. Second, management was convinced that the traditional requirements of IMF programs, namely establishing macroeconomic stability and liberalizing trade, were not enough: what was now also needed were "second generation reforms" that strengthened a country's institutions and improved the functioning of its financial system. Thus, Michel Camdessus listed among the objectives of IMF programs 20 :
• "sound financial systems and flexible markets that promote an efficient allocation of resources;
• transparent regulatory systems that establish clear rules under which the private sector can flourish;
• appropriate social policies that protect the most vulnerable segments of the population; and finally,
• "good governance"--that is, transparent and accountable governments that follow the rule of law."
Third, management had become more hands on; instead of establishing broad guidelines and leaving the negotiations to staff, Stanley Fischer in particular became much more involved in the details of Fund programs, communicating continuously with staff in the field. Management's involvement in practice led Fund programs to include a greater number of conditions, to an extent that many believed to be excessive 21 .
There were numerous criticisms at the time and subsequently of IMF programs with Asian crisis countries. As noted, the countries concerned have very unpleasant memories of their involvement with the Fund, leading them to try to avoid any future occurrence.
The IMF itself, both in the form of staff papers and reports of the Independent Evaluation , has admitted to some deficiencies in the conditions accompanying IMF lending.
As a result, the institution has committed to strengthening its pre-crisis surveillance and reducing the scope and detail of its program conditionality.
More difficult to judge because of the counterfactual problem is the effectiveness of IMF lending in actually limiting financial crises. What is certain is that even in the best of cases, large IMF lending did not prevent sharp currency depreciations, large output losses, and severe hardship. The most successful of these programs was probably the one for Mexico; early in 1995 the IMF and the US government lent over $40 billion to that country, which faced large redemptions of US dollar-linked securities (Tesobonos) as well as a large current account deficit. The lending package allowed all the Tesobono holders to be repaid, but the Mexican peso nonetheless depreciated from a little more than concerned, justifying greater caution on the part of international investors ("wake up call"), and adjustment measures are unlikely to be painless. But it seems to be the case in the present environment of high capital mobility that minimizing the impact of crises and eliminating their spread would require substantially greater lending than the IMF has been able to provide. IEO (2003) concluded that the Fund's initial program with Korea (in 1997) was ineffective because it did not involve enough financing
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. As for Argentina, the IMF's continued lending in the face of policy problems has been blamed for making the ultimate crisis worse, when it finally came; by that time, the IMF no longer was willing to lend the additional amounts that might have prevented a default 24 .
Turning to the third new task, the IMF has contributed in a modest way to improving the transparency and accountability of countries willing to adopt its standards on data dissemination, financial regulation, and codes of conduct of monetary and fiscal policy. Among other factors, this has had the effect of putting emerging market debt on a par with high yield corporate debt as an asset class 25 , contributed to the narrowing of spreads on emerging market borrowing, and further enhanced capital mobility to developing countries. As a result of greater information, investors now discriminate more easily between different countries. Thus contagion, which was rampant during the 1997-98 Asian crises, was absent at the time of Argentina's default late in 2001. Time will tell whether this progress is durable. Success in this area tends, in any case, to reduce the need for crisis lending, a much more visible and exciting task for the Fund. 23 The initial program needed to be supplemented by pressure from G7 governments on their banks to maintain exposure to Korea. 24 See discussion in Mussa (2002) . 25 See World Bank (2006).
IV. Prospects for Meaningful Reform
If one accepts the hypothesis that the Fund's current role is diminished and will remain so unless there is significant reform 26 , then one can ask whether there are plausible reforms that can significantly expand its role. The main reforms being considered are changes that would expand its mandate and those that would improve its governance. Taken together, they might make the substance of the IMF's work both more relevant to today's international monetary system and more acceptable to a broader set of its membership.
An updated role at the centre of the international monetary system?
As argued above, the current environment of high capital mobility makes a return to a system of pegged exchange rates both undesirable and unlikely. Thus, the IMF will not reclaim the mandate it had under Bretton Woods to manage such a system. A more fundamental way of increasing the Fund's ability to play the lender of last resort would be to give it the ability to create its own liquidity, without the need to increase quotas or go through the formal ratification process of SDR allocations. Such a scheme could allow the creation of balances in an international currency that would be under the control of the IMF and that could be increased as needed in an international crisis. In this way, true liquidity crises-the attempt by lenders to liquidate risky assets and turn them into cash, thus provoking a crisis-could be staved off, since investors would recognize that liquidity would always be available for countries that were solvent to meet their external obligations.
Though this vision of the international monetary system has much to admire, it raises fundamental issues of delegation of national sovereignty. Clearly, a true lender of last resort role would require the IMF to issue its own (world) currency, not the currency of any member country. Thus, issuing the SDR would not be possible without a change in the nature of the SDR, which in its current form is a basket of national currencies (dollar, euro, yen, and pound sterling). Otherwise, the IMF would usurp the roles of the respective central banks. While having a multilateral institution at the top of the international monetary pyramid makes sense, it requires a much more elaborate and effective international governance structure than we have today or that is likely to emerge for many decades to come.
The experience with creating a common currency in Europe is instructive. It is clear that the European Central Bank needs to lean on other community institutions for public support and to resist pressures from governments to modify its monetary policy.
Europe has institutions developed over the last 50 years-a parliament, court of justice, a supra-national executive body (the EU commission) with responsibilities for trade and competition issues, among others-and there has been widespread harmonization and cooperation in a number of fields. Despite this, there are concerns about a "democratic deficit," and the ECB has had to assert its independence and establish its legitimacy.
Without global supporting institutions, a world central bank would have difficulty operating effectively. More tellingly, governments would not accept to give it the powers that such a role would require.
The second avenue for reestablishing the IMF's influence would boost its role in managing a system of mostly flexible exchange rates-that is, by increasing its exchange rate surveillance, rather than increasing its lending operations. Critics of the 1976 Jamaica Agreement that legitimized the current international monetary system (what some have called a "non-system" 28 ) have been vocal from the start. They have objected to the complete discretion it gives to countries to choose any exchange rate regime going from a hard fix to a clean float. Even if one accepts the need for that discretion, more conditions could be put on how countries operate the regimes they have chosen. To date, the IMF's policy advice has focused more on macroeconomic policy than on foreign exchange market intervention. In the view of some, the Fund should take a much more pro-active stance with countries, like China, that intervene heavily in foreign exchange markets and consistently in the same direction (see, e.g. Goldstein, 2006) . This, after all, is a sign of "currency manipulation" that is proscribed by Article IV and by the Guidelines to Floating established by the IMF's Executive Board in 1977.
Can this provide a major boost to the Fund's role? That institution has been reluctant to label a country a currency manipulator, essentially for two reasons. First, it is hard to formulate the criteria to apply in a world where there is no reason to outlaw any particular exchange rate regime. Since countries have the right to intervene in order to reduce volatility, some amount of one-way intervention is normal if shocks, even temporary ones, are persistent. Countries like China with undeveloped financial markets and facing imperfect capital mobility are more likely to need to intervene than more advanced countries with deep financial markets. The alternative would be for China to accept potentially large exchange rate movements that could weaken its financial system and cause widespread bankruptcies. Thus, caution is in order when formulating any rule that would limit the scope to intervene
29
. The second, practical, reason that the IMF has not been pro-active in this area is that member countries, through their representatives on the Executive Board, have been reluctant to point the finger at others because they themselves might be on the receiving end. For instance, the prolonged speculative 28 Corden (1983) attacks against the European Monetary System parities led EU countries to undertake prolonged one-way intervention, so they are not well placed to criticize others in this regard. Similarly, any country might become embroiled in a political or economic crisis that might be made worse by turmoil in foreign exchange markets.
It is also needs to be recognized that China's case is a special one which is likely to be resolved sooner or later since the authorities agree in principle with the need for greater flexibility. As noted, most other emerging countries have already adopted more flexible exchange rate regimes. Hence, even if the IMF became more engaged with China, this would not provide a model for an enduring new role in managing the world economy. As for the IMF becoming more active in resolving global imbalances, this is an even greyer area than exchange rate manipulation. Current account deficits and surpluses are not necessarily bad: some countries have investment needs in excess of their own saving, and conversely. Judgment needs to be applied to identify the cases when the imbalance is the result of an inappropriate policy mix. When, as now, the United States' external deficit position is in large deficit (with as counterparts the current account surpluses of Asian economies and the oil exporting countries) and the IMF is critical of US policies, the likelihood that the IMF can have a major influence in resolving imbalances is small. It is clear that the current US administration has no sympathy for the view that that US policy is at fault for causing its current account deficit, preferring to blame excessive saving in the rest of the world 30 .
More equitable representation?
29 Nevertheless, the extent of China's intervention and the size of her foreign exchange reserves make the case for currency manipulation fairly clear. executive board would not be appropriate, unless the ECB were given the right to speak for those governments-surely contrary both to the hard-won independence of the bank and the interests of the EU governments.
While the IMF has admitted a representative of the euro zone to the Executive Board as observer, consolidation of euro-zone seats continues to be resisted, and it would probably require an amendment to the Articles of Agreement. It is thus unlikely to provide an easy solution to the under-representation of emerging market countries.
Moreover, as discussed above, the contention that the euro-zone is over-represented in terms of quota shares is by no means indisputable. However, has concluded that only a consolidation of European quotas, allied with a large quota increase so that no country would actually reduce its quota in SDR terms, could bring about a meaningful expansion of the voting share of emerging market economies. But a large quota increase and amendment of the Articles of Agreement would generate major resistance, and its success would by no means be assured.
The effect of a reallocation of quota shares on the IMF's operations should also not be exaggerated. Most decisions are taken by consensus at the Executive Board. 
V. What Should the IMF Do?
The IMF's strength is that it is at present the only effective global financial institution. The IMF's role in standing ready to provide finance to countries with balance of payments problems needs to continue. While the IMF is less active now, it would be reckless to assume that it will no longer be needed to assist in the case of future financial problems. However, as is recognized by member countries and endorsed by the IMF's management and executive board, IMF lending needs to be more limited and accompanied by fewer conditions. As suggested above, with increasing mobility of private capital this role has been diminishing, and will continue to do so.
The IMF also has a comparative advantage in acquiring and analysing information on macroeconomic, balance of payments, and financial matters. While it is by no means the only organization able to do so-for instance, such information is also available from the OECD, the BIS, and the World Bank-its traditional mandate in this area and the extent of its membership has meant that expertise is broader at the IMF than at these other institutions. It has the responsibility under Article IV to perform "firm surveillance" over members' policies in this area, so that it can insist on accurate and upto-date information.
Committee (IMFC).
It should continue its evolution in the direction of making data, analytical information, and candid assessments publicly available. While two decades ago the reports prepared for IMF consultations were rarely if ever made public, now it is routine to do so. This is an important public good. The IMF's World Economic Outlook publication now makes its data base available on the web, and the IMF posts many other staff papers. Clearly dissemination of information is an important activity that deserves to be expanded. The IMF could go further in making public its assessments of the overall policy stance of countries. Moreover, these could be more candid-less influenced by the desire to make a negotiated program succeed by painting an overly optimistic picture of the outlook.
As argued, it seems inevitable that the IMF should have a less prominent role in the international monetary system than it had in the 1980s and 1990s. In such an environment, it is important for the institution to concentrate on the tasks for which it has a clear comparative advantage. This would involve not of an expansion of IMF activities, but rather the IMF doing better what it does best. Such a strategy would be more likely to enhance the reputation of the institution than a search for new mandates. The IMF's failures during the 1990s were to a significant extent the result of getting involved in too many different areas where staff had limited expertise and power to effect change.
Achieving institutional reforms, for instance, is largely dependent on political forces beyond the control of officials in Washington; respect for a country's sovereignty and democratic processes should in any case limit the Fund to an advisory role in this area.
The IMF would be well advised to learn from the experience of national central banks. After the oil price shocks, the central banks of many OECD countries were taken to task by their populations for neither maintaining full employment nor containing inflation. Through reforms that aligned their objectives more clearly on inflation control, and by achieving their targets, central banks were able to reestablish their authority.
Legitimacy and public support for an official institution are enhanced by a well-defined mandate and targets that are in its power to achieve.
VI. Conclusions
Capital mobility is here to stay, and no system that requires reestablishing extensive restrictions on capital will work. This has several implications. First, the exchange rates between most of the world's currencies-all but the currencies of the smallest countries, or those with so-far undeveloped financial markets-will exhibit a considerable degree of flexibility. The IMF will not once again be given the mandate to manage a system of pegged exchange rates, and its role in managing a more flexible system with vague rules of the game will necessarily be a modest one. Second, no international organization can serve as international lender of last resort because the amount of liquidity required would be dwarfed by private capital flows-unless that institution can, like a domestic central bank, create its own liquidity. However, the world
is not yet ready for a global central bank, nor is it likely to be for the foreseeable future.
A third implication, resulting from the first two, is that the international monetary system in its current form cannot be managed to the extent it was in the immediate postwar period. It will necessarily evolve in ways that are driven mainly by private capital, rather than being dictated by the official sector. In that context, any reforms to the IMF are not going to change fundamentally its position in the world economy.
However, there are reforms that can help the IMF function better within its limited role. IMF lending should be more short-term and accompanied by fewer conditions. More equitable representation of countries can help to increase its legitimacy and improve decision-making. Greater diffusion of information and more candid country assessments can enhance the IMF's contribution to international public goods.
Paradoxically, reforms that expand the Fund's powers beyond its capabilities may be counter-productive. A more modest but focused role can help promote effectiveness and accountability by restricting the institution to areas where it has a clear mandate and unchallenged expertise. 
